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ABSTRACT 
An assertion can be a factual claim or the expression of  a value judgment. Since Hume the view 
that these are two incompatible types of  assertions that cannot be connected by 
argumentation, has often been defended, and, more recently, has also been called into question. 
In the following paper I attempt to show that the truth both of  a descriptive sentence and of  a 
normative sentence is derived from its “practical relevance”. The demand that an assertion 
must be true and must be based on knowledge of  the asserter is derived from the demand that 
an assertion must be practically relevant to the addressee. On the basis of  this claim I will 
sketch a model of  what it means to say that a normative statement is true and is based on a 
realistic image of  the world. 
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1. Assertion1 
 
“Assertion” can be defined in at least two ways: It can be defined as a speech act 
and thus be distinguished from other speech acts such as questions, commands, 
etc. This is what linguists do, and most of  them are satisfied with it. However, 
another way of  dealing with assertions – a way that has been popular with 
philosophers for some time – is more ambitious: finding out the norms of  
assertion, or defining what is a “good assertion”. Regarding an answer to this 
question, we are far from any consensus. 
 
1.1. What is an assertion? 
 
Let us tackle the first question first. The most mature speech act theory currently 
available is that of  Daniel Vanderveken (1990). Vanderveken assembles a number 
of  speech acts (or more precisely, a number of  English verbs) under the heading 
of  “assertives” (1990, 169-181). Assertives are distinguished from other speech 
acts by their assertive “illocutionary point” (roughly: the basic purpose of  the 
                                                 
1 I am very grateful for the most valuable comments made by the participants of  the workshop 
“Moral realism and political decisions” (Bamberg, Dec. 19 – 22, 2013), by Robert Hümmer, Jan 
Henning Schulze and Sebastian Krebs. The remaining blunders are all mine. 
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act) which is defined as “representing as actual a state of  affairs” (1990, 105). An 
assertive can be true or false, sincere or a lie, relevant or irrelevant. An assertive is 
also distinguished from a quote, i.e. the pronouncing of  a sentence without 
representing it as actual, e.g., in order to demonstrate its syntax on a blackboard. 
Neither sincerity, nor truth, nor belief, nor relevance, nor justification is 
constitutive of  assertion, yet notions of  “assertion” and “good assertion” are 
often confused. 
The assertion itself  is the “primitive assertive” in Vanderveken’s theory 
(1990, 169); the other assertives such as answers, reassertions or denials require 
additional contextual qualifications. Testimonies and conjectures are also 
assertives, but they are distinguished from plain assertions by the degree of  
strength in their “mode of  achievement”. Testimonies are stronger than regular 
assertions, conjectures are weaker. In Vanderveken’s theory the degree of  strength 
is a parameter that is independent of  the assertive illocutionary point; this 
independence will be important in what follows.  
However, the definition of  assertives as speech acts “representing as actual a 
state of  affairs” contains a well-sealed Pandora’s Box of  problems, namely the 
question of  how an actual state of  affairs is distinguished from a state of  affairs 
that is not actual – the problem of  truth. The pre-theoretical notion of  “actual” 
is sufficient for most linguistic purposes; therefore the box need not be opened 
unless the question is raised as to what makes an assertion a good assertion. 
 
1.2. What is a “good assertion”? 
 
Searle (1969) also broaches this question. He gives preparatory rules that state 
the contextual prerequisites needed for a speech act to be successful or “happy” 
(1969, 60). There are two preparatory rules for assertion (1969, 66; S = speaker, H 
= hearer, p a proposition): 
 
1. S has evidence (reasons etc.) for the truth of  p. 
 
2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows  
(does not need to be reminded of, etc.) p. 
 
The first rule states that an assertion should not be careless; the second rule 
states that it should not be irrelevant. Both careless and irrelevant assertions are 
still assertions, yet they are hapless or “bad”. 
Searle’s sincerity rule states (ibid.): 
 
S believes p. 
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Needless to say (obvious to both S and H), that an insincere assertion is still 
an assertion, though often a bad one. In the case of  assertion (not with other 
speech act types) the sincerity rule might seem to be covered by the preparatory 
rule 1 above. If  one has reasons to believe that p, should one believe that p – or 
not? Not necessarily. In many cases there are arguments both for and against a 
proposition. Therefore a speaker might very well be able to “justify” a proposition 
and at the same time believe it to be false and utter it in order to lead the hearer 
astray. A justification does not necessarily make an assertion a good assertion. 
There are also cases in which belief  is entirely unjustified, if  it is based on 
misleading intuitions, for example. However, intuitions need not be misleading. 
The reliability of  chicken-sexers who cannot explain their criteria is one example, 
another example (Gladwell 2005), is the incident of  a group of  experts who 
intuited that a statue offered to a museum was forged and who were entirely 
unable to give reasons for this opinion. A later inquiry proved their intuitions to 
be correct. Those incidents are not rare: It is not the worst physician who intuits a 
diagnosis on the basis of  his experience – and he is definitely entitled to assert it. 
If  intuitions have proved to be reliable by induction, then they do not need 
further justification by arguments. In everyday life – as opposed to scientific 
discourse – justification is often neither sufficient nor necessary for a good 
assertion, as the assertion norms for everyday life are different from those 
concerning scientific knowledge. 
 
1.3. Scientific and everyday-life knowledge 
 
Knowledge, just like truth, is one of  the most debated concepts and there is no 
hope of  ever achieving a consensus. Assertion in everyday life obviously does not 
require corroborated expert knowledge but rather everyday commonsense 
understanding.2 How does this type of  knowledge relate to belief? To attempt to 
answer this, it may be instructive to look at the use of  the words know and 
knowledge in natural languages.  
The fundamental difference between the verbs to know (that) and to believe 
is their factivity: The verb to know is factive, i.e. it presupposes the truth of  its 
complement clause, whereas to believe is non-factive. If  A says: “B knows that p” 
she says that B believes that p, and she indicates through the said presupposition 
that she herself  believes p as well; beliefs are called truths or knowledge by those 
who believe them. “Factivity” of  the verb to know means that the speaker of  the 
utterance “B knows that p” regards p as a fact – nothing else. In particular, it 
                                                 
2 The work published in epistemology appears to aim at a third type in between these, the 
function of  which has not yet been made clear to me. 
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does not mean that p is (in fact) a fact – whatever ‘being a fact’ is supposed to 
mean. Not even the “facts” of  Euclidean geometry were safe from revisions; even 
more vulnerable is what we assert every day or what we believe to be our 
knowledge. When I hear somebody saying that the earth is not flat, I claim the 
right to assert “he knows that the earth is not flat” and do not feel obliged to 
examine whether or not his belief  is just accidentally true. I would argue, in fact, 
that most of  our everyday beliefs are only accidentally true and lack any sound 
justification. 
On the other hand, if  A says “B believes that p” (instead of  “knows”) she 
does not indicate that she herself  believes p as well, nor does she exclude it. In this 
case, however, the choice of  the verb to believe votes out the alternative to know, 
together with its presupposition. In most contexts the choice of  to believe triggers 
an inference (a clausal conversational implicature, Gazdar 1979, 59), a weak 
indication, that A does not assent to p. Otherwise she could and should have used 
the verb to know. 
When transferred to the first-person the meanings of  the verbs more or less 
coincide. “I believe that p” and “I know that p” can refer to the same attitude 
towards p: belief  can be very firm. Nevertheless, the weakening effect of  the 
implicature in play in the first-person, compared to assertions made in the second-
person or third-person, affects the meaning of  to know by adding a connotation of  
certainty, so that the use of  to know is preferred in the upper range of  gradual 
firmness of  belief. Therefore one can say “I believe that p but I could be 
mistaken” without contradiction, as opposed to “I know that p but I could be 
mistaken”. However, the contradiction of  “I know that p but I could be 
mistaken” is merely a pragmatic one: we conventionally use the phrase “I know 
that” to affirm our subjective certainty. Strictly speaking, we should add “but I 
could be mistaken” to any assertion – if  that addition were not entirely 
irrelevant. 
One might assume that the verb to know “expresses” certainty whereas to 
believe does not; however, the words knowledge and to know can as well be used to 
underscore uncertainty or subjectivity, as in the common phrases to my knowledge 
and as far as I know, which are phrases used to hedge one’s bets, used to explicitly 
indicate less reliable knowledge. This is true not only for English but for most 
Western languages: 
 
French: à ma connaissance/autant que je sache 
Italian: per quanto io ne sappia 
Spanish: según mi saber/por lo que sé 
German: meines Wissens/so viel ich weiß 
Latin: quantum scio 
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Greek: ὅσον γ’ ἐμὲ εἰδέναι 
 
Moreover, the history of  science teaches us that even scientific knowledge is 
nothing but temporarily received belief  that has to be put to the test by further 
regulated experience. Many of  our convictions (perhaps all of  them) are default 
assumptions. We rely on them as long as there is no substantial evidence to the 
contrary. Of  course scientific knowledge requires a certain level of  justification, 
which is provided by scientific methods which themselves require justification by 
philosophy of  science. By contrast, the everyday-life concept – the one pertinent 
to assertion – requires only belief  and subjective certainty. The assertions 
observed in everyday life range from those based on scientific knowledge to 
completely careless ones; however, one would lose touch with reality by 
demanding more than subjective certainty from common people making 
assertions. The general linguistic norm of  “good” assertions requires subjective 
certainty (that is, sincerity). Justified or otherwise corroborated assertions are 
required by different norms pertaining to particular situations such as academic 
discourse or judicial hearings, which I will not deal with in this paper. The 
knowledge required for good everyday-life assertions is mere belief  combined with 
subjective certainty. It is sufficient to have a revocable default assumption, whose 
justification may be not fully reliable as long as its contrary is less reliable. The 
burden of  proof  here lies with the skeptic. 
The knowledge requirement appears to boil down to Searle’s sincerity rule. 
However, this is not quite so: A speaker can have a belief  and yet be reluctant to 
assert it. Putting aside norms of  politeness, etc., let us consider a speaker who has 
a belief  but nevertheless doubts its reliability. In some situations an explicit guess 
is more appropriate than an unqualified assertion. 
 
1.4. The epistemic standards of  assertion 
 
Consider the following dialogue between A, standing in the hall and ready to 
leave, and B sitting on her sofa: 
 
A: Where is your car key? 
B: In the drawer. 
A: No, it isn’t. 
B: In my coat. 
A: No. 
B: Sorry, here you are. 
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Apparently that conversation is quite natural and B’s behavior is appropriate if  
not exactly optimal. Before answering the first question B could have made an 
inquiry in order to obtain reliable information about the location of  the key. 
What she actually did was to enlist A in that inquiry because she rightly believed 
she would get the result faster this way. This is both rational and appropriate even 
if  it turns out that her first guesses were mistaken and she could have found the 
key easily on her own. Her first answer was a guess and it was helpful in finding 
the key. Was her answer an assertion? Yes, it was both a guess and an assertion.3 
There is no linguistic difference between a guess and an assertion because they 
share the illocutionary point and the difference lies in the context.4 The stakes in 
that situation were very low; the risk taken with a false assertion was next to 
zero. In a different case, if  B had not had a chance to examine the drawer, if  the 
conversation could not have been continued after the first reply and if  the 
consequences of  not finding the key had been serious, that is, if  the stakes had 
been high, B’s answer based on insecure knowledge would have been entirely 
inappropriate. In such a situation she should have downgraded her assertion to an 
explicit guess or have acted very differently. This means, the strength of  assertion 
is to be taken as a parameter independent of  the assertive point (as shown by 
Vanderveken 1990, see above) – it ranges from frivolous guess to oath – and the 
speaker is obliged by the assertion rule to adjust its strength to the epistemic 
standards of  the situation. In some cases that strength has to be made explicit, 
while in others it is unnecessary or irrelevant. The obligation to explicitly indicate 
the strength of  assertion correlates with the epistemic standards of  the speech 
situation and the asserted proposition’s presumed reliability. Even a frivolous 
assertion, a joke, is appropriate when the stakes are low and the consequences of  
“error” are insignificant. By the way, a good joke can be made a better one by 
adding a well fabricated “justification” to the frivolous assertion. 
The epistemic standards have to be distinguished from the epistemic 
position of  a person in a given situation. The epistemic standards are dependent 
on the social activity the assertion is embedded in, whereas the epistemic position 
a person holds is merely the degree of  reliability of  knowledge independent of  
future action. The neglect of  action is a frequent but serious omission in the 
analysis of  assertion. The norms of  good assertion require a consideration of  the 
role of  assertion in social practice. 
 
                                                 
3 I use the term “assertion” for all assertives because the difference between answers, oaths etc. 
and assertions in the narrow sense is merely contextual. 
4 For a contextualist notion of  knowledge/assertion cf. DeRose 1995: 30 or Sosa 2000: 2, e.g. 
Stanley (2004) critically discusses various versions of  contextualism, none of  which relate 
knowledge to relevance or practice. 
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1.5. The embedding of  assertion in social practice: relevance 
 
An assertion is hardly ever just supposed to represent a fact in the world. The 
perlocutionary effect intended by an assertion is hardly ever restricted to merely 
convincing the addressee of  the proposition asserted; a relevant assertion aims at 
further, indirect responses, that is, it aims at guiding the future activities of  the 
addressee. Nobody would ever make a promise, for example, if  it had no other 
effect than limiting the range of  the speaker’s future activities by the obligation 
thereby incurred, as a promise is an investment aimed at the future cooperative 
behavior of  the addressee. Assertion is embedded in social activity, and the 
appropriateness of  assertion is not only dependent on the epistemic position of  
the asserter but essentially related to that activity. 
A very instructive example is discussed in Lackey (2011, 253-255): an 
oncologist in a teaching hospital “knows” from a very competent student that one 
of  her patients has cancer. This knowledge is “isolated secondhand knowledge” 
based on the diagnosis of  the student who has reviewed the relevant data, which 
the oncologist has not had a chance to see. The student is entitled to assert to her 
professor that the patient has cancer; the professor is also entitled to assert this to 
her husband at dinner (p. 272), but neither the student nor the professor are 
entitled to assert it to the patient because of  the severe consequences of  such an 
assertion for him. It is the severity of  the consequences that makes first hand 
expert knowledge necessary. The doctor’s epistemic position is the same when 
talking to her husband as when talking to the patient, yet the stakes and the 
epistemic standards differ.5 When talking to her husband, the assertion is part of  
the language game “dinner conversation”; when talking to her patient, it is part 
of  a therapy where isolated secondhand knowledge is out of  place. The epistemic 
position of  the speaker is insufficient for deciding if  an assertion complies with 
the norms of  assertion or not; the embedding in action has to be considered 
(Stanley 2005, 88, 92). 
Another example is discussed in Becker 2012, 266:  
 
Imagine your partner in a conversation somewhere in Europe needs to buy 
a pencil and you tell him that he can buy one in the Arya Stationery Mart 
in New Delhi, Nai Sarak, near the Vaish Co-Operative Bank. That is true 
and you can easily justify it using the yellow pages on the Internet. 
Nevertheless it is a brazen violation of  our rules of  conversation: it is not 
relevant.  
 
                                                 
5 I agree that when the patient accidentally overhears the conversation not addressed to him, 
he has no right to complain to the asserter (Moran 2005: 22; Goldberg 2011: 192 disagrees). 
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2. Relevance 
 
The “truth norm of  assertion” thesis, which enjoys some popularity, is, I argue, 
absurdly weak. Any speaker in any speech situation is epistemically entitled by 
his knowledge to assert an infinite number of  true and known propositions – 
about the number of  his toes and fingers, mathematical equations, capitals of  
states, almost all negative sentences and so on. This can be demonstrated by the 
absurdity of  the Library of  Baghdad, which is similar to Jorge Luis Borges’s 
Library of  Babel (Borges 1999, The Total Library, Borges 2007). Borges’ Total 
Library is a fascinating fabrication: it holds an infinite set of  books, each of  them 
finite, containing all combinations of  letters (22 letters plus space, period, and 
comma). It contains every text possible in every language that can be 
transliterated by the set of  those 22 letters (other letters can be defined as 
combinations; the library contains an infinite number of  such definitions, too). 
Hence, the library contains a detailed and true history of  our future, an infinite 
number of  false ones, the “Persae” of  Aeschylus (and his “Egyptians”), the exact 
number of  times that the waters of  Ganges have reflected the flight of  a falcon, 
and so forth. All of  these books are untraceably hidden in an infinite muddle of  
books containing meaningless combinations of  letters. 
The Library of  Baghdad is different: its books contain only true sentences 
(not a single false one) in impeccable English, without a single misprint. It 
contains, just like the Library of  Babel, an infinite set of  true sentences derived 
logically or by other recursive definitions from a basis of  true and known 
sentences compiled by a large committee of  scholars. All the sentences differ from 
each other, not a single sentence is recorded twice, and all sentences are of  finite 
length. Nevertheless, it is as useless as the Library of  Babel, because you have 
virtually no chance to find a single interesting sentence among the infinite 
number of  true and irrelevant ones. Natural languages like English are recursive, 
that is, you can make any number of  additions to a sentence without affecting its 
grammaticality or truth. For instance, the sentence “The library of  Babel is very 
large” can be extended to the form “The library of  Babel is very, very large”. You 
can add “very” any number of  times; there is no natural number of  additions 
that renders the sentence ungrammatical or false. This means for any natural 
number there is a sentence in the Library. The books containing this family of  
sentences alone would fill the entire cosmos. And there are other sources of  
infinity, to name but two of  them: “1 is less than 2”, “1 is less than 3” etc. Or: 
“Human beings have 11 fingers and human beings have 12 fingers, or (!) Paris is 
the capital of  France.” Adding “or Paris is the capital of  France” to any of  an 
infinite set of  true or false sentences will yield a true sentence. Let us assume that 
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the set of  sentences is not ordered according to its recursive enumeration. The 
library would even be less useful if  it contained the true sentences whose truth 
has not been established by experts so far (e.g. the distance between the first and 
the second occurrence of  the letter ‘e’ in this paper), as almost all of  these truths 
contained in the library of  Baghdad do not matter at all; what matters are the 
very few sentences that happen to be relevant. Therefore, the point of  assertion is 
to pick out the most relevant proposition of  an infinite number of  true, known and 
justifiable ones.6 Relevance is both as relevant and as easy to overlook as the air we 
breathe because our cognition rejects almost all of  the irrelevant information in 
our environment. 
Science is a selection of  what is worth knowing to us for practical purposes 
(= of  what is relevant) chosen out of  an infinite number of  truths (Bolzano 1837, 
3, Putnam and Putnam 1990, 206). This does not imply that scientific findings are 
of  immediate use. In many cases the practical use of  a finding has been 
discovered later. Nevertheless, basic research is justified by the hope for 
application in the future. Good science must be relevant in the most general 
speech situation of  all: the life of  mankind.  
 
2.1. Relevance and the theory of  Conversational Implicature 
 
“Be relevant!” is one of  the Maxims of  Conversation postulated by H. P. Grice 
(1975), whose inferential theory of  meaning is one of  the cornerstones of  thinking 
in linguistics and philosophy of  language. Further linguistic research (above all: 
Sperber and Wilson 1986) has attributed a much more dominant role to relevance 
than Grice ever imagined. 
According to Grice and his followers the hearer does not understand an 
utterance by decoding its semantics; instead, he takes the utterance together with 
the context as a hint to the speaker’s communicative intention. The hearer infers 
the speaker’s meaning; the most important of  those inferences is called 
“conversational implicature” or briefly “implicature”. What is a (conversational) 
implicature?7 
Consider the following dialogue: 
 
A: “Do your daughters speak foreign languages?” 
                                                 
6 Cf. Jary 2010: 164: “There is an indefinite amount of  true information, but most of  it is of  no 
use or interest to most individuals. Accounts of  assertion merely in terms of  commitment to 
truth thus miss out on the point of  assertion.” Cf. also Jary 2011, 2010: 155. 
7 In the following account of  the Gricean theory I do not intend to do justice to Grice’s texts. 
Grice focusses on the intention of  speakers, whereas I am more interested in a rational and, if  
possible, deductive reconstruction of  implicatures. 
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B: “Paula speaks French.” 
 
A might interpret B’s answer as follows: 
 
a) Paula does not speak other foreign languages. 
b) The other daughters do not speak any foreign language. 
c) Paula is a daughter of  B. 
d) French is a foreign language to Paula. 
 
The information given in a-d) is neither “said”, nor logically implied by the 
sentence uttered by B, but “implicated” through conversational implicatures. 
Given that in normal speech situations parents boast with the achievements of  
their children, A would infer a-b), as B would withhold relevant information if  
Paula and his other daughters would in fact speak several foreign languages. If  
Paula was not B’s daughter but a French neighbor, his utterance would not be 
false. A infers c) and d) on the basis of  the additional premise that B’s utterance is 
an answer to his question. If  any of  the inferences a-d) were false, B would not 
have been cooperative. Normally a speaker like A would infer a-d) on the 
assumption that B is cooperative – which is certainly rational as humans 
normally cooperate with each other. Cooperation is the default assumption that 
can only be overridden by substantial evidence to the contrary. 
Another example shows that implicatures are not only important in 
everyday life but also to philosophical matters like logic. When I say: “I am going 
to Italy or France”, a normal hearer would most likely understand that I go to 
one of  these countries but not to both (exclusive “or”), whereas in a logic seminar 
you would learn that the meaning of  “or” would include the case of  “both” 
(inclusive “or”). According to Grice the exclusion of  “both” is a conversational 
implicature. A cooperative speaker would have used “and” instead of  “or” if  he 
intended to go to both countries. The “or” sentence would be true but too weak. 
We assume that our partners in conversation make their statements as strong as 
necessary, that is, if  they can make a stronger statement without additional effort 
they would normally choose the stronger one.8 
For all these inferences the hearer used an additional premise: The speaker 
is cooperative. Only by this premise A can infer that Paula is a daughter of  B. If  
this were not the case B would not have answered A’s question and therefore B 
would not be cooperative. The relation of  conversational implicature and 
entailment can be described as follows: 
 
                                                 
8 Horn 1972, 1989 showed that this analysis applies to some possibly 
operators of  rising strength in Aristotle’s square of  oppositions (“Horn scales”). 
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The sentence X uttered by the speaker does not entail Y; the utterance is a 
conversational implicature iff  the hearer assumes that the speaker is cooperative 
(premise 2) and the situation is such that the speaker would not be cooperative if  
Y was false (premise 3). Premise 3, if  spelled out, contains the individual analysis 
of  the given speech situation. The three premises taken together entail Y. 
The core of  Grice’s theory is that the assumption of  cooperativity is essential 
in understanding utterances. This is the assumption that speakers comply with 
the Cooperative Principle (1975, 1989, 26): 
 
COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE: 
Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, 
by the accepted purpose or direction of  the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. 
 
Then he specifies what it means to be cooperative by four maxims of  
conversation: 
 
MAXIM OF QUANTITY 
Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of  the exchange). 
Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
 
MAXIM OF QUALITY  
Do not say what you believe to be false. 
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.  
 
MAXIM OF RELATION 
Be relevant. 
 
MAXIM OF MANNER 
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Avoid obscurity of  expression. 
Avoid ambiguity. 
Be brief  (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
Be orderly. 
 
I infer from B’s answer that his other daughters do not speak foreign 
languages, assuming that he complies with the Maxim of  Quantity; I infer that 
Paula is his daughter, assuming that he complies with the Maxim of  Relevance, 
that is, he answers my question and does not change the topic in an unpredictable 
way. These conversational implicatures play a pivotal role in communication; 
human communication would break down entirely if  the hearers were restricted 
to the pure semantics of  the sentences uttered. 
Grice was well aware that the four maxims are only a first draft in need of  
specification. One important development of  his theory was the reduction of  the 
four maxims. The most drastic cut was imposed by Sperber and Wilson 1986. 
Their “Relevance Theory” aims to reduce the four maxims to one: relevance. The 
Maxim of  Quantity is easy to reduce: if  you do not make your contribution as 
informative as is required you withhold relevant information; if  you make your 
contribution more informative than required, you say something irrelevant. The 
Maxim of  Quality (truth) is much harder to deal with, as I will point out later. 
The Maxim of  Relation need not be reduced. The Maxim of  Manner has been 
reduced by Relevance Theory in the following way: if  your speech is obscure, 
ambiguous, prolix or not well-ordered, it is hard to understand; if  you have two 
information sources, one short and clear and the other obscure, obviously the first 
would be more relevant to you: “other things being equal, the greater the 
processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of  the input to the individual 
at that time” (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 609). 
Unfortunately, Wilson and Sperber threw the baby out with the bathwater 
and abandoned both the cooperative principle and the relation of  cooperation and 
practice. Furthermore, they revised the everyday meaning of  the term relevance 
and transformed it into a technical term. I regard these departures from Grice 
unnecessary if  not detrimental, therefore I will not elaborate on Relevance 
Theory, although what follows is significantly influenced by the work published in 
that framework. 
What is relevance? Let me suggest the following draft: 
 
RELEVANCE 
A proposition is relevant 
 with respect to an activity and 
 with respect to an observer of  that activity 
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iff 
its recognition furthers or impedes the achievement of  the activity’s goals 
as assumed by the observer 
to the degree the observer (subjectively) rates its furthering or impeding 
effect. 
 
Of  course, an object like a hammer, a non-verbal action, or an observed fact, 
can be relevant as well; however, all of  these non-propositional entities can be 
projected onto propositions: ‘that the hammer is there’, ‘that the action is 
realized’, ‘that the fact obtains’. The observer can, but need not, be an agent 
involved in that activity. Relevance is subjective but it can appear to be non-
subjective when a community forms a consensus about it; our judgments are often 
mistaken, so are our judgments about relevance. Relevance can be negative if  the 
entity impedes the achievement of  the goals.9 A proposition can be both relevant 
with respect to one activity and irrelevant or impeding with respect to another 
activity. For instance, a lie can be positively relevant in the eyes of  the hearer 
with respect to his activity, and negatively relevant in the eyes of  the speaker 
with respect to the hearer’s activity and assumed goals, and positively relevant in 
the eyes of  the speaker with respect to his own activity and goals. Moreover, it can 
be negatively relevant to a higher degree with respect to the liar’s activities and 
goals in the liar’s later and revised judgment. Relevance is a gradual concept. The 
number of  activities an entity pertains to is indefinite; it ranges from “taking the 
next step” to “living a good life in a well-organized society.” 
A notion of  “practical relevance” would approximate to what pragmatists 
call “truth” (James 1922, 72–73):10 
 
What would it [the assertion, TB] practically result in for us, were it true? It 
could only result in our orientation, in the turning of  our expectations and 
practical tendencies into the right path […]. 
 
This is what a good assertion does: It serves as orientation, turning our practical 
tendencies into the right path. And this is what sincerity aims at; when our 
sincere assertion turns out to be false we have still done our best and we have not 
broken a rule; the assertion of  a false yet practically relevant proposition is a 
better assertion than that of  a true and irrelevant proposition.  
 
2.2. Cognitive relevance 
                                                 
9 The term relevance without qualification is to be taken as ‘positive relevance.’ 
10 The relation between truth and practice is described – much better than by any (other?) 
pragmatist – by Wohlrapp (2014). 
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A further central aspect of  relevance is the capacity of  human beings to select the 
most relevant entities among the less relevant ones. The major achievement of  
Relevance Theory is the Cognitive Principle of  Relevance (Wilson and Sperber 
2004, 610): 
 
COGNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANCE 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of  relevance. 
 
Wilson 2009, 395 puts it more explicitly: 
 
The spontaneous working of  our perceptual mechanisms tends to pick out 
the most relevant inputs, the spontaneous working of  our memory retrieval 
mechanisms tends to activate the most relevant potential contextual 
assumptions and the spontaneous working of  our inferential mechanisms 
tends to yield the most relevant conclusions. 
 
We perceive exactly those frequencies of  electromagnetic waves that are pertinent 
to our life: light; we direct our attention to moving objects rather than to the 
unmoved background, etc. This is the result of  evolution: higher living organisms 
have this capacity; otherwise they would have become extinct. In fact, the ability 
to select the relevant is the most basic ability of  living organisms. This is what 
human (and non-human) cognition does: picks the relevant information out of  a 
messy context. Attention is “a cognitive process that selects out important 
information from the world around us (through all of  our five senses) so that our 
brain does not get overloaded with an overwhelming amount of  information” 
(Solso et al. 2008, 87, cf. James 1890, 402). 
The ability to select what is relevant is the result of  evolution. Humans and other 
animals have developed several “evolved psychological mechanisms” (Buss 2009, 
50-53) like the predisposition “to learn to fear snakes”, which is  
 
designed to take in only a narrow slice of  information – slithery movements 
from self-propelled elongated objects. Our evolved preferences for food, 
landscapes, and mates are all designed to take in only a limited subset of  
information from among the infinite array that could potentially constitute 
input (Buss 2009, 51).  
 
The same applies to memory. If  we remembered everything we experienced, 
we would have tremendous difficulty retrieving quickly those memories most 
relevant to direct adaptive action. A reasonable evolution-based prediction, 
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therefore, is that human attention and memory are extremely selective, 
designed to notice, store, and retrieve information that has the most 
importance for solving adaptive problems (Buss 2009, 387) 
 
Animal learning is selective in the same way (Alcock 1993, 50-54): 
 
A hypothesis to account for the specialized, biased nature of  animal learning 
is that these features reduce the risk that an animal will learn the wrong 
things or learn irrelevant information. […] Just as the ability to associate 
toxic effects with novel food items should be a function of  the risk of  
sampling poisonous foods, so too the ability to learn the spatial features of  
an area should be related to the advantages gained by such learning. 
According to this view, in species whose males and females have different-
sized home ranges, the sex that typically travels the greater distances should 
exhibit superior spatial learning ability. […] When tested in a variety of  
mazes, which the animals had to solve in order to receive food rewards, males 
of  the wide-ranging meadow vole consistently made fewer errors than 
females of  their species […]. But in both the prairie and the pine voles there 
was no difference in the spatial learning performance of  males and females, 
which have similar home ranges and so are confronted with equivalent 
spatial learning problems in their natural lives. 
 
Moths are more or less deaf, but they can perceive the high-intensity ultrasound 
of  bats, to which they react by diving, flipping or spiraling erratically, and thus 
avoid being caught (Alcock 1993, 126f.). The ability to select the most relevant 
does not require a brain; it appears to be the most basic feature of  life that has 
been developed together with the cell membrane (Campbell et al. 2008, 125, 131): 
 
One of  the earliest episodes in the evolution of  life may have been the 
formation of  a membrane that enclosed a solution different from the 
surrounding solution while still permitting the uptake of  nutrients and 
elimination of  waste products. The ability of  the cell to discriminate in its 
chemical exchanges with its environment is fundamental to life, and it is the 
plasma membrane and its component molecules that make this selectivity 
possible. [P. 131:] Sugars, amino acids, and other nutrients enter the cell, and 
metabolic waste products leave it. The cell takes in oxygen for use in cellular 
respiration and expels carbon dioxide. […] Although traffic through the 
membrane is extensive, cell membranes are selectively permeable and 
substances do not cross the barrier indiscriminately. 
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My claim is that behaving in a practically relevant way is the gist of  
intelligence, both innate and acquired by experience, communication or reflection. 
Knowledge or whatever there is in our minds is not an end in itself, as its purpose 
is to guide our actions. 
 
2.3. Relevance in cooperation 
 
What Relevance Theory neglects is the biological foundation of  cooperativity and 
the relation of  relevance to practice. Tomasello 2014 presents a detailed 
description of  the evolution of  cooperativity in human beings. Cooperativity is 
“wired” in social insects and also in mammals like wolves and apes, which can be 
observed in their cooperative hunting behavior. Tomasello describes the 
qualitative leap in the development of  human cooperativity: “Humans but not 
apes engage in cooperative communication in which they provide one another 
with information that they judge to be useful for the recipient” (2014, 36). The 
critical difference between cooperativity with humans and with other mammals is 
the human ability to represent the perspective of  others (2014, 56, 137f.), thus 
they are able to judge what is relevant for the partner playing his role in the 
cooperative activity. Apes do not have this ability (Tomasello 2014, 52): 
 
If  food is hidden in one of  two buckets (and the ape knows it is only in one 
of  them) and a human then points to a bucket, apes are clueless [… ; ] it does 
not occur to them that the human is trying to inform them helpfully […]. 
They make the competitive inference “He wants in that bucket; therefore the 
food must be in there”, but they do not make the cooperative inference, “He 
wants me to know that the food is in the bucket.” 
 
Humans “began to make evaluative judgments about others as potential 
collaborative partners: they began to be socially selective, since choosing a poor 
partner meant less food” (2014, 37). The evolution of  cognitive relevance cannot 
be understood without its relation to practice: “in evolution, being smart counts 
for nothing if  it does not lead to acting smart” (Tomasello 2014, 7). It is hard to 
see how one can be (positively) relevant without being cooperative or cooperative 
without being relevant. Relevance depends on the activities the agents are 
engaged in. Grice’s Cooperative Principle demands (1975, 1989, 26) the following:  
 
COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of  the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged. 
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The activities need not be talk exchanges, as Grice’s examples show (e.g. p. 32); 
conversations are often held in order to support other practical purposes. Social 
animals like us are geared to expect cooperative behavior from their neighbor; this 
expectation is innate and corroborated (and qualified) by experience.11 
Cooperativity of  our fellow human beings is the default assumption that can, of  
course, be overridden by negative evidence. Sperber and Wilson, as do many other 
critics, allege that “Grice’s principle and maxims are norms which communicators 
and audience must know in order to communicate adequately” (Sperber & Wilson 
1986, 162). On the contrary: The fact is that it takes quite some intellectual effort 
not to behave according to Grice’s rules.  
During a conversation one should not say what is irrelevant or withhold what 
is relevant (Grice’s Maxims of  Quantity and Relation, pp. 26f.). What one says 
should be perspicuous (Maxim of  Manner) as obscurity reduces the relevance of  
an assertion. Sperber & Wilson 1986 showed that Grice’s maxims can be reduced 
to relevance,12 even including the maxim of  truth (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 583): 
 
We will argue that language use is not governed by any convention or maxim 
of  truthfulness in what is said. Whatever genuine facts such a convention or 
maxim was supposed to explain are better explained by assuming that 
communication is governed by a principle of  relevance. 
 
Truth is certainly not a sufficient condition for assertion; an assertion must be 
relevant to the activity the speakers are involved in. Is it necessary? 
 
2.4. Is truth necessary?  
 
The demand for relevance excludes almost all of  the true but inappropriate 
assertions: Of  the infinite number of  assertions such as “zero is less than one”, 
“zero is less than two”, etc., it excludes all but the one that happens to be 
practically relevant. If  truth is not sufficient for assertion – is truth necessary? 
                                                 
11 Aristotle (Politics, 1253a 2-3) regarded man as a “social animal by nature”; Rousseau (1762: 
289 [End of  book IV]) saw “a principle of  justice and virtue” to be innate, and Reid (1785: 193-
195, VI, xxiv) elaborated on his principles of  veracity and credulity: “we speak truth by 
instinct” and “in the matter of  testimony, the balance of  human judgment is by nature inclined 
to the side of  belief ”. 
12 However, despite harsh criticism (Clark 1987, Gorayska & Lindsay 1993 and many others) 
the followers of  “Relevance Theory” hold on to the view that relevance is a mere cognitive 
matter independent of  goals or practice. 
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What is the use of  a necessary condition that “reduces” the number of  
“appropriate” assertions to an infinite number? 
Certainly the maxim of  truthfulness can be overridden by other norms: 
When commenting on a new haircut or wallpaper or a drawing by a six-year-old 
child, truthfulness can be out of  place. In most cases relevance implies 
truthfulness (at least sincerity, since the pursuit of  truth is a life’s work). 
However, if  truth does not support the accepted purpose of  the talk exchange 
then relevance wins out.  
A lie is not any false statement. An irrelevant false assertion will be simply 
ignored; a misleading false assertion will be punished, even harder if  the speaker’s 
different goals are visible so that the intention to mislead can be alleged. On the 
other hand, a false assertion can even be held in high esteem if  it discloses 
intended positive consequences. A classical example (from the Dissoi Logoi) is the 
act of  foisting a medicine into a drink prepared for one’s father or mother who 
would refuse to take it otherwise. It is not truth what counts but helpful guidance 
vs. harmful misguidance in the activity the assertion forms part of. Truth appears 
to be the core of  assertion because in almost all cases only true statements are 
relevant, but this does not exclude the possibility that the important status of  
truth is derived and secondary to relevance. 
There are a considerable number of  linguistic structures in utterances whose 
truth cannot be established as opposed to their relevance. One is future 
contingents: “There will be a math test tomorrow” is relevant today (when you 
can do some preparation) and will be irrelevant tomorrow (when it’s too late), 
although its truth can only be established tomorrow, after the test. Conditionals 
are always false because you can always find far-fetched conditions that render 
them false. “If  you do these exercises, you will pass the test” can be very helpful, 
despite the fact that the addressee can always be hit by lightning before having 
the opportunity to pass. Considering these far-fetched conditions, however, is 
irrelevant. The same holds for counterfactuals: “If  you had done your exercises, 
you would have passed the test” can be a relevant hint for next time, although its 
truth can never be established. Evaluative statements like “This sundae is too big 
for you” can be relevant, ending a futile discussion and avoiding sickness, 
although it might never be shown as true. A statement like “Christ has risen from 
the dead” can guide successful practice although its truth cannot be shown. Three 
topics that have been thoroughly discussed in Relevance Theory are irony (for 
example Wilson and Sperber 2012, 123-145), metaphor (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 
277f.) and loose talk (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 59f.). An utterance like “I’ll be 
ready in a second” is false (and harmless) in most cases, but the relevant 
inferences such as ‘you can wait until I’m done’ remain true. Van der Henst et al. 
2002 found out that speakers asked to tell the time round up from 3:08 to 3.10 
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even if  they have digital watches (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 54, 60), in their 
attempt to make their answer easier to process and thereby more relevant. The 
falsity of  an utterance will be ignored if  the deviation from truth is irrelevant. 
If  somebody, let’s say from India, asked me “Where did you grow up?” I 
could think of  at least three possible answers: 
 
a) In Haar. 
b) In a suburb, 500 yards outside the city limits of  Munich. 
c) In Munich. 
 
Option a) would be true but obscure (as nobody in India will have heard of  that 
suburb) and therefore irrelevant. Option b) would be true but unnecessarily prolix 
and therefore less relevant. Option c) would be literally false but it would still be 
relevant as it triggers true inferences as ‘He grew up in an urban environment, is 
familiar with Bavarian culture etc.’ I would use the false answer c) and not even 
consider the true alternatives.  
The analysis of  metaphor in Relevance Theory is quite revealing (Sperber 
and Wilson 2012, 277f.). Consider the utterance: “John is a soldier!” The mental 
concept of  a soldier includes a number of  attributes that will be activated to 
different degrees dependent on the speech situation: 
 
a)  John is devoted to his duty. 
b)  John willingly follows orders. 
c) John does not question authority. 
d) John identifies with the goals of  his team. 
e) John is a patriot. 
f) John earns a soldier’s pay. 
g) John is a member of  the military. 
 
When the utterance is an answer to the question “What does John do for a 
living?”, the inferences f) and g) will be activated, a) and b) will probably not even 
come to the mind of  the hearer. The inferences triggered with the hearer are 
entirely different when the utterance is an answer to the question “Can we trust 
John to do as we tell him and defend the interests of  the department in the 
University Council?”. In this case a-d) will be triggered and f-g) will not come to 
the mind of  the hearer, as his cognition is geared to picking out the relevant 
information. He will even discard the proposition of  the utterance itself. The 
process of  understanding is the same in both cases; it is not the case that the 
hearer first considers the literal interpretation, discards it, and then comes up 
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with the metaphorical interpretation.13 The literal falsity of  metaphorical 
utterances is irrelevant. Truth normally goes with relevance; if  they are in 
conflict, relevance prevails.  
The constitutive rule of  the assertive point can now be defined (altering 
Vanderveken’s definition, 1990, 105) as follows:  
 
CONSTITUTIVE RULE OF THE ASSERTIVE POINT: 
The assertive point consists in representing a state of  affairs as optimally 
relevant to the activity the addressee is involved in. 
 
The relevance norm of  assertion defines the “good” assertion: 
 
RELEVANCE NORM OF ASSERTION: 
An assertion is regarded as “good” by an observer with respect to an activity 
to the degree the observer judges the utterance as relevant to that activity. 
 
 
3. The relevance of  truth 
 
Does all that mean that truth is irrelevant? Not at all.14 Every subject has a 
theory of  the world outside (whose existence, please, should not be denied). Let us 
use a common metaphor: this theory is like a map that serves as a guide for our 
entire life-practice. This map is not a precise replica of  the world, which would be 
as useless as a map of  Italy to a scale of  1:1. Our theory of  the world can be as 
different from the world itself  as Italy is different from a folded sheet of  paper 
and nevertheless serve its purpose. It contains only relevant data (others will 
never be perceived or soon be forgotten) gathered through experience and 
organized by the mind. This map can again be mapped onto a set of  propositions 
that represent the theory (this is the representation of  the theory we can talk 
about), a web of  beliefs15, which is one single coherent set of  propositions the 
subject regards as true. The relations between the propositions that constitute the 
web are relations of  support, e.g. entailment relations or others used in non-
deductive, substantial arguments.16 These relations are used in justification. An 
                                                 
13 It escaped the attention of  Relevance Theoreticians that Weinrich 1966: 43-49 proposed 
exactly the same analysis of  metaphor, if  in the words of  the sixties. 
14 What follows is substantially influenced by Wohlrapp 2014; the errors caused by adaptation 
and by misunderstanding are of  course  my own. 
15 A metaphor attributable to Quine/Ullian 1978. 
16 “Substantial arguments” in the sense  used by Toulmin 1958. The web is not closed under 
entailment: When I believe a set of  propositions I do not necessarily believe everything that 
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isolated belief  is weaker than one embedded in relations of  justification. That 
web, as a whole, is “verified” both by its consistency and through successful life-
practice.17 Success in life-practice confirms the web as a realistic image of  the 
world – as realistic as a map that corresponds to the landscape it is supposed to 
depict. We set off  with common sense and when we run into a problem, we make 
repairs; cognitive relevance will help find the flaw. The “truths” in this web are 
mere defaults that can be changed whenever doubt comes up.18 Social truths are 
established by communication; the transpersonal perspective on these beliefs gives 
them the appearance of  objectivity. Objective truth can be hoped for but will 
never be reached by human research, which is harmless as long as our practice is 
successful. A true utterance does not correspond to some “fact” of  the outside 
world but to a proposition in the web of  beliefs maintained by those who believe 
it to be true because their interaction with the outside world on the basis of  that 
belief  is successful. Mankind used to be happy with the belief  that the earth is 
flat for a long time, with counterevidence patched up as long as possible. The 
observation that the topmost part of  incoming ships is visible first was adapted 
by the speculation of  the sea rising like a back or a mountain ridge above the 
earth level (“on the wide back of  the sea”, Odyssey, γ 142). “That the earth is 
flat” was regarded to be true because in those days common practice based on 
that belief  was successful and counterevidence too weak. Now it is false because 
we believe otherwise – yet we should be aware that some of  our truths might be 
ridiculed by future generations. Nevertheless, we have the right to call them 
truths, just like the early Greeks had the right to call their truths “truths”. 
When a speaker makes an assertion complying with the relevance norm, the 
asserted proposition will be suitable for guiding the hearer’s activities (Gauker 
2007: 132). The cooperative speaker believes it to be suitable for the hearer’s 
activities just as he believes it to be suitable for his own corresponding activities 
he would undertake in the hearer’s position. Therefore he chooses a proposition 
from his own web of  beliefs, that is, from the set of  propositions he believes to be 
true. In this way the truth of  an utterance follows from its relevance (that is, 
normally; exceptions have been discussed above), and the truth/knowledge norm 
                                                                                                                                                        
follows from that set because I might not realize the connection. This is not a minor problem for 
intensional semantic theory. 
17 A common misunderstanding of  pragmatism results from applying the verification process 
to some particular practice as if  an isolated assumption (that helps achieving a particular goal) 
would establish truth. 
18 The pragmatist theory of  truth gives no reason to pragmatize truth conditional semantics; 
“A entails B” in the language L means that whoever utters A will be committed to B as well by 
the truth conditional semantic rules of  language L. 
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is derived from the relevance norm. Taken on its own, the truth/knowledge norm 
is far too weak.  
The assertion norm: “an assertion ought to be relevant” can itself  be 
asserted – is this assertion true? 
It is true if  and only if  complying with it leads to successful practice.19 A 
true norm is one that leads to successful practice, that is, if  and only if  complying 
with it leads to social practice that satisfies the agents involved in that practice. 
This works even without reflection: successful behavior stays, unsuccessful 
behavior dies out. If  there is disagreement among the agents about the success, 
those who are not satisfied believe the norm to be false; a consensus can only be 
achieved by political action, preferably rational discourse. More often than not 
the entire society is mistaken about the truth of  a norm, just like about the truth 
about the earth’s shape. There have been many atrocities in history that were 
approved of  by an alarming number of  people who considered themselves 
righteous. The falsity of  a norm can only be established by a norm that turns out 
to be more satisfactory in practice; of  course, a rational discourse about norms 
can be useful for planning repairs, useful for assessing ahead of  time whether 
certain goals are good goals to work for, or useful for negotiating conflicts of  
interest, but it cannot establish the truth of  a norm. The prohibition of  alcohol in 
the US was a perfectly rational measure from an armchair point of  view but it 
failed when put to practice. On the other hand, the abolition of  slavery was 
successful although it took quite some time to convince everybody that it was 
based on a true norm. The range of  unsuccessful practice extends from trivial 
cases like a glimpse into a refrigerator, based on the false assumption that it 
contains a bottle of  milk, all the way up to the failure of  “real socialism”, which 
took decades to become manifest and is still debated in some circles. The truth of  
a norm is a challenge trophy in political discourse. 
In conclusion, successful practice verifies normative propositions in the same 
way as descriptive ones. A web of  beliefs (both normative and descriptive) that 
guides successful practice is a realistic image of  the world. 
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